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ABSTRACT 
Incentive compatibility is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of 
understanding is provided. Key words are: incentive compatibility, game theory, implementation, 
mechanism, Bayes, Nash, and revelation. 
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY 
John 0. Ledyard 
Allocation mechanisms, organizations, voting procedures, regulatory bodies, and many other 
institutions are designed to accomplish certain ends such as the Pareto-efficient allocation of 
resources or the equitable resolution of disputes. In many situations it is relatively easy to conceive 
of feasible processes; processes which will accomplish the goals if all participants follow the rules 
and are capable of handling the infoimational requirements. Examples of such mechanisms include 
marginal cost pricing, designed to attain efficiency, and equal division, designed to attain equity. Of 
course once a feasible mechanism is found, the important question then becomes whether such a 
mechanism is also infoimationally feasible and compatible with the "natural" incentives of the 
participants. Incentive compatibility is the concept introduced by Hurwicz ([1972], pp. 320) to 
characterize those mechanisms for which participants in the process would not find it advantageous 
to violate the rules of the process. 
The historical roots of the idea of incentive compatibility are many and deep. As was 
pointed out in one of a number of recent surveys, "the concept of incentive compatibility may be 
traced to the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith who claimed that in following individual self-interest 
the interests of society might be served. Related issues were a central concern in the 'Socialist 
Controversy' which arose over the viability of a decentralized socialist society. It was argued by 
some that such societies would have to rely on individuals to follow the rules of the system. Some 
believed this reliance was naive; others did not." (Groves and Ledyard [1986], pp. 1). Further, the 
same issues have arisen in the design of voting procedures. Concepts and problems related to 
incentives were already identified and documented in the 18th century in discussions of proposals by 
Borda to provide alternatives to majority rule committee decisions. 
Incentive compatibility is both desirable and elusive. The desirability of incentive 
compatibility can be easily illustrated by considering public goods, goods such that one consumer's 
consumption of them does not detract from another consumer's simultaneous consumption of that 
good. The existence of these collective consumption commodities creates a classic situation of 
market failure; the inability of markets to arrive at a Pareto-optimal allocation. It was commonly 
believed, prior to Groves and Ledyard [1977], that in economies with public goods it would be 
impossible to devise a decentralized process that would allocate resources efficiently since agents 
would have an incentive to "free ride" on others' provision of those goods in order to reduce their 
own share of providing them. Of course Lindahl [1919] had proposed a feasible process which 
mimicked markets by creating a separate price for each individual's consumption of the public good. 
This designed process was, however, rejected as unrealistic by those who recognized that these 
"synthetic markets" would be shallow (essentially monopsonistic) and therefore buyers would have 
no incentive to treat prices as fixed and invariant to their demands. The classic quote is ". . . it is in 
the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given 
collective consumption activity than he really has . . .  "(Samuelson [1954], pp. 388-9). Allocating 
public goods efficiently through Lindahl pricing would be feasible and successful if consumers 
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followed the rules; but it would not be successful since the mechanism is not incentive compatible. 
If buyers do not follow the rules, efficient resource allocation will not be achieved and the goals of 
the design will be subverted because of the motivations of the participants. Any institution or rule 
designed to accomplish group goals must be incentive compatible if it is to perform as desired. 
The elusiveness of incentive compatibility can be most easily illustrated by considering a 
situation with only private goods. Economists generally model behavior in private goods markets by 
assuming that buyers and sellers "follow the rules" and take prices as given. It is now known, 
however, that as long as the number of agents is finite, then any one of them can still gain by 
misbehaving and, furthermore, can do so in a way which cannot be detected by anyone else. The 
explanation is provided in two steps. First, if there are a finite number of traders, and none have a 
perfectly elastic offer curve (which will be true if preferences are non-linear) then one trader can 
gain by being able to control prices. For example, a buyer would want to set price where his 
marginal benefit equaled his marginal outlay and thereby gain monopsonistic benefits. Of course, if 
the others know that buyer's demand curve (either directly or through inferences based on revealed 
preference) then they would know that the buyer was not "taking prices as given" and could respond 
with a suitable punishment against him. This brings us to our second step. Even though others can 
monitor and prohibit price setting behavior, our benefit-seeking monopsonist has another strategy 
which can circumvent this supervision. He calculates a (false) demand curve which, when added to 
the others' s offer curves, produces an equilibrium price equal to that which he would have set if he 
had direct control. He then calculates a set of preferences which yields that demand curve and 
participates in the process as if he had these (false) preferences. Usually this involves simply acting 
as if one has a slightly lower demand curve than one really does. Since preferences are not able to 
be observed by others, he can follow this behavior which looks like it is price-taking, and therefore 
"legal," and can do individually better. The unfortunate implication of such concealed misbehavior 
is that the mechanism performs other than as intended. In this case, resources are artificially limited 
and too little is traded to attain efficiency. 
In 1972 Hurwicz established the validity of the above intuition. His theorem can be 
precisely stated after the introduction of some notation and a framework for further discussion. 
The Impossibility Theorem 
The key concepts include economic environments, allocation mechanisms, incentive 
compatibility, the no-trade option, and Pareto-efficiency. We take up each in turn. 
An economic environment, those features of an economy which are to be taken as given 
throughout the analysis, includes a description of the agents, the feasible allocations they have 
available and their preferences for those allocations. While many variations are possible, I 
concentrate here on a simple model. Agents (consumers, producers, politicians, etc.) are indexed by 
i = 1, .. . , n. X is the set of feasible allocations where x = (x 1, • • .  , Xn) is a typical element of X. (An
exchange environment is on in which X is the set of all x = (x 1, . • •  , xn) such that xi ;::: O and
,L xi = _L wi, where wi is i 's initial endowment of commodities.) Each agent has a selfish utility
function ui(xi). The environment is e = [/ ,X, ui, ... , un]. A crucial fact is that initially information
is dispersed since i, and only i, knows ui. We identify the specific knowledge i initially has as i 's
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characteristic, ei. In our model, ei = ui.
Although there are many variations in models of allocation mechanisms, I begin with the 
one introduced by Hurwicz [ 1960]. An allocation mechanism requests information from the agents 
and then computes a feasible allocation. It requests information in the form of messages m; from
agenti through a response function Ji (mi, ... ,mn). Agenti is told to report/i (m, ei) if others have
reported m and i 's characteristic is e i • An equilibrium of these response rules, for the environment
e , is a joint message m such that m; = f i (m , e i) for all i. Let µ(e , f) be the set of equilibrium
messages for the response functions f in the environment e . The allocation mechanism computes a
feasible allocation x by using an outcome function g (m) on equilibrium messages. The net result of 
all of this in the environment e is the allocation g (µ(e, f )) = x if all i follow the rules,f. Thus, for
example, the competitive mechanism requests agents to send their demands as a function of prices 
which are in tum computed on the basis of the aggregate demands reported by the consumers. In 
equilibrium, each agent is simply allocated their stated demand. (An alternative mechanism, 
yielding exactly the same allocation in one iteration, would request the demand function and then 
compute the equilibrium price and allocation for the reported demand functions.) It is well known, 
for exchange economies with only private goods, that if agents report their true demands then the 
allocations computed by the competitive mechanism will be Pareto- optimal. 
It is obviously important to be able to identify those mechanisms, those rules of 
communication, that have the property that they are self-enforcing. We do that by focusing on a 
class of mechanisms in which each agent gains nothing, and perhaps even loses, by misbehaving. 
While a multitude of misbehaviors could be considered it is sufficient for our purposes to consider a 
slightly restricted range. In particular we can concentrate on undetectable behavior, behavior which 
no outside agent can distinguish from that prescribed by the mechanism. We model this limitation 
on behavior by requiring the agent to restrict his misrepresentations to those which are consistent 
with some characteristic he might have. An allocation mechanism is said to be incentive compatible 
for all environments in the class E if there is no agent i and no environment e in E and no
characteristic e •i such that (e le•;) is in E (where (e le•;) is the environment derived from e by
replacing e; with e •;) and such that
where u; ( , e;) is i's utility function in the environment e. That is, no agent can manipulate the
mechanism by pretending to have a characteristic different from the true one and do better than 
acting according to the truth. The agent has an incentive to follow the rules and the rules are 
compatible with his motivations. 
Incentive compatibility is at the foundation of the modem theory of implementation. In that 
theory, one tries to identify conditions under which a particular social choice rule or performance 
standard, P : E � X, can be recreated by an allocation mechanism under the hypothesis that 
individuals will follow their self-interest when they participate in the implementation process. In our 
language, the rule P is implementable if and only if there is an incentive compatible mechanism 
(f, g) such that g (µ(e, f )) = P (e) for all e in E. The theory of implementation seeks to answer the
question "which P are implementable?" We will see some of the answers below for P which select 
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from the set of Pareto-efficient allocations. Those interested in more general goals and performance 
standards should consult Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin [1979], Maskin [1986], or Postlewaite 
[1986]. 
An allocation mechanism is said to have the no trade-option if there is an allocation e at 
which each participant may remain. In exchange environments the initial endowment is usually such 
an allocation. Mechanisms with a no-trade option are non-coercive in a limited sense. If an 
allocation mechanism possesses the no-trade option then the allocation it computes for an 
environment e, if agents follow the rules, must leave everyone at least as well off, using the utility 
functions fore, as they are at e. That is, for all i and all e in E
An allocation mechanism is said to be Pareto-efficient in E if the allocations selected by the 
mechanism, when agents follow the rules, are Pareto-optimal in e • That is, for each e in E there is
no allocation xi in X such that, for all i ,
ui (x*, ei) � ui(g [µ(e ,/)], e;) 
with strict inequality for some i . 
With this language and notation Hurwicz's theorem on the elusive nature of incentive 
compatibility in private markets, subsequently expanded by Ledyard and Roberts [1974] to include 
public goods environments, can now be easily stated. 
THEOREM 1: In classical (public or private) economic environments with a finite number of 
agents, there is no incentive compatible allocation mechanism which possesses the no-trade option 
and is Pareto-efficient. (Classical environments include pure exchange environments with Cobb­
Douglas utility functions.) 
A more general version of this theorem in the context of social choice theory has been proven by 
Gibbard [ 1973] and Satterthwaite [ 1975] with the concept of a "non-dictatorial social choice 
function" replacing that of a "mechanism with the no-trade option."
There are a variety of possible reactions to this theorem. One is to simply give up the search 
for solutions to market failure since the theorem seems to imply that one should not waste any effort 
trying to create institutions to allocate resources efficiently. A second is to notice that, at least in 
private markets, if there are a very large number of individuals in each market then efficiency is 
"almost" attainable. (See Roberts and Postlewaite [1976].) A third is to recognize that the behavior 
of individuals will generally be different from that implicitly assumed in the definition of incentive 
compatibility. A fourth is to accept the inevitable, lower one's sights, and look for the most efficient 
mechanism among those which are incentive compatible and satisfy a voluntary participation 
constraint. We consider the last two options in more detail. 
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Other Behavior: Nash Equilibrium 
If a mechanism is incentive compatible, then each agent knows that their best strategy is to 
follow the rules according to their true characteristic, no matter what the other agents will do. Such 
a strategic structure is referred to as a dominant strategy game and has the property that no agent 
need know or predict anything about the others' behavior. In mechanisms which are not incentive 
compatible, each agent must predict what others are going to do in order to decide what is best. In 
this situation agents' behavior will not be as assumed in the definition of incentive compatibility. 
What it will be continues to be an active research topic and many models have been proposed. Since 
most of these are covered in Groves and Ledyard [1986], I will concentrate on the two which seem 
most sensible. Both rely on game-theoretic analyses of the strategic possibilities. The first 
concentrates on the outcome rule, g , and postulates that agents will not choose messages to follow 
the specifications of the response functions, but to do the best they can against the messages sent by 
others. Implicitly this assumes that there is some type of iterative process (embodied in the response 
rules) which allows revision of one's message in light of the responses of others. We can formalize 
this presumed strategic behavior in a new concept of incentive compatibility. An allocation 
mechanism (f, g) is called Nash incentive compatible for all environments in E if there is no 
environment e , no agent i , and no message m *i which i can send such that
where µ(e , f) is the 11equilibrium11 message of the response rules f in the environment e , g (m) is the 
outcome rule, and [mlm *i] is the vector m where m *i replaces mi. In effect this requires the
equilibrium messages of the response rules to be Nash equilibria in the game in which messages are 
strategies and payoffs are given by u (g (m )). It was shown in a sequence of papers written in the late 
1970's, including those by Groves and Ledyard [1977], Hurwicz [1979], Schmeidler [1980], and 
Walker [1981], that Nash incentive compatibility is not elusive. The effective output of that work 
was to establish the following: 
THEOREM 2: In classical (public or private) economic environments with a finite number of agents 
there are many !'{ash incentive compatible mechanisms which possess the no-trade option and are 
Pareto-efficient. 
With a change in the predicted behavior of the participants in the mechanism, in recognition of the 
fact that in the absence of dominant strategies agents must follow some other self-interested 
strategies, the pessimism of the Hurwicz theorem is replaced with the optimistic prediction of a 
plethora of possibilities for the design of mechanisms yielding efficient allocations, or other goals, in 
a manner compatible with the incentives of the agents. (See Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 
[1979], Maskin [1986], Postlewaite [1986], and Groves and Ledyard [1986] for comprehensive 
surveys of these results including many for more general social choice environments.) Although it 
remains an unsettled empirical question whether participants will indeed behave this way, there is a 
growing body of experimental evidence that seems to me to support the behavioral hypotheses 
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underpinning Nash incentive compatibility, especially in iterative tatonnement processes. 
Other Behavior: Bayes Equilibrium 
The second approach to modeling strategic behavior of agents in mechanisms, when 
dominant strategies are not available, is based on Bayesian decision theory. These models, called 
games of incomplete information (see Myerson [ 1985]), concentrate on the beliefs of the players 
about the situation in which they find themselves. In the simplest form, it is postulated that there is a 
common knowledge (everyone knows that everyone knows that . . .) probability function, 1t(e ),
which describes everyone's prior beliefs. Each agent is then assumed to choose that message which 
is best against the expected behavior of the other agents. The expected behavior of the other agents 
is also constrained to be "rational" in the sense that it should be best against the behavior of others. 
This presumed strategic behavior is embodied in a third type of incentive compatibility. (It could be 
argued that the concept of incentive compatibility remains the same, based on non-cooperative 
behavior in the game induced by the mechanism, while only the presumed information structure and 
sequence of moves required to implement the allocation mechanism are changed. Such a view is not 
inconsistent with that which follows.) An allocation mechanism (f ,g) is called Bayes incentive 
compatible for all environments in E given 7t on E if there is no environment e * , no agent i , and no 
message m *i which i can send such that
fui (g [µ(e ,f )!m*i], e*i)d1t(e I e*io > fui(g[µ(e ,f )], e*i)d1t(e I e*i) 
where, as before,µ is the equilibrium message vector and g is the outcome rule. Further, 1t(e I e*i) 
is the conditional probability measure one given e *i, and ui is a von Neumann-Morganstem utility
function. In effect, this requires the equilibrium messages of the response rules to be Bayes 
equilibrium outcomes of the incomplete information game with messages as strategies, payoffs 
u (g (m )) and common knowledge prior 7t. 
There are two types of results which deal with the possibilities for Bayes incentive 
compatible design of allocation mechanisms, neither of which is particularly encouraging. The first 
type deals with the possibilities for incentive compatible design which is independent of the beliefs. 
The typical theorem is illustrated by the following result proven by Ledyard [1978]. 
THEOREM 3: In classical economic environments with a finite number of agents, there is no Bayes 
incentive compatible mechanism which possesses the no-trade option and is Pareto-efficient/or all 1t 
onE. 
Understanding this result is easy when one realizes that any mechanism (f, g) is Bayes incentive
compatible for all 7t for all e in E if and only if it is (Hurwicz) incentive compatible for all e in E.
Thus, the Hurwicz impossibility theorem again applies. 
The second type of result is directed towards the possibilities for a specific prior 7t; that is, 
towards what can be done if the mechanism can depend on the common knowledge beliefs. The 
most general characterizations of the possibilities for Bayes incentive compatible design can be 
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found in Palfrey and Srivastava [1986] and Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986]. They have shown 
that two conditions, called monotonicity and self-selection, are necessary and sufficient for a social 
choice correspondence to be implementable in the sense that there is a Bayes incentive compatible 
mechanism that reproduces that correspondence. The details of these conditions are not important. 
What is important is that many correspondences do not satisfy them. In particular, there appear to be 
many priors n and many sets of environments E such that there is no mechanism which is Bayes
incentive compatible, provides a no-trade option, and is Pareto-efficient. Thus, impossibility still 
usually occurs even if one allows the mechanism to depend on the prior. 
One recent avenue of research which promises some optimistic counterweight to these 
negative results can be found in Moore and Repullo [1986], and Palfrey and Srivastava [1986]. In 
much the same way that the natural retreat from Hurwicz incentive compatibility to Nash incentive 
compatibility created opportunities for incentive compatible design, these authors have shown that a 
retreat to refinements of Bayes incentive compatibility may also open up possibilities. Refinements 
arise by varying the equilibrium concept in a way that reduces the number of (Bayes or Nash) 
equilibria for a given e or n. Moore and Repullo use subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Palfrey and
Srivastava eliminate weakly dominated strategies from the set of Nash equilibria. They have 
discovered that, in pure exchange environments virtually all performance correspondences are 
implementable if behavior satisfies these refinements. In particular, any selection from the Pareto­
correspondence is implementable for these refinements, and so there are many refined Nash incentive 
compatible mechanisms which are Pareto-efficient and allow a no-trade option. It is believed that 
these results will transfer naturally to refinements of Bayes equilibria, but the research remains to be 
done. 
Incentive Compatibility as a Constraint 
Another of the reactions to the Hurwicz impossibility result is to accept the inevitable, to 
view incentive compatibility as a constraint, and to design mechanisms to attain the best level of 
efficiency one can. If full efficiency is possible it will occur as the solution. If not, then one will at 
least find the second-best allocation mechanism. Examples of this rapidly expanding research 
literature include work on optimal auctions (Harris and Raviv [1981], Matthews [1983], and 
Myerson [1981]), the design of optimal contracts for the principle-agent problem, and the theory of 
optimal regulation (Baron and Myerson [1982]). As originally posed by Hurwicz [1972], pp. 299-
301 ), the idea is to adopt a social welfare function W (x, e ), a measure of the social welfare attained
from the allocation x if the environment is e and then to choose the mechanism (f , g) to maximize
the (expected) value of W subject to the "incentive compatibility constraints," the constraint that the
rules (f, g) be consistent with the motivations of the participants. One chooses (f, g) to
maximize J W(g [µ(e ,f )], e )dn(e) 
subject to, for every i ,  every e, and every e •i, 
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As formalized here, the incentive compatibility constraints embody the concept of Bayes incentive 
compatibility. Of course other behavioral models could be substituted as appropriate. 
Sometimes a voluntary participation constraint, related to the no-trade option of Hurwicz, is 
added to the optimal design problem. One form of this constraint requires that (f, g) also satisfy, for
every i and every e , 
f ui (g [µ(e )], ei)d1t(e I ei):::; Jui (9[e ], ei)d1t(e I ei). 
In practice this optimization can be a difficult problem since there are a large number of possible 
mechanisms (f, g ). However, an insight due to Gibbard [1972] can be employed to reduce the range
of alternatives and simplify the analysis. Now called the revelation principle, the observation he 
made was that to find the maximum it is sufficient to consider only mechanisms, called direct 
revelation mechanisms, in which agents are asked to report their own characteristics. The reason is 
easy to see. Suppose that (f • , g •) solves the maximum problem. Let (F • , G • ) be a new (direct
revelation) mechanism defined by (F*i (m, e;) = ei and G* (m) = g(µ(m,f )). Each i is told to report
his characteristic and then G • computes the allocation by computing that which would have been
chosen if the original mechanism (f • , g •) had been used honestly in the reported environment.
(F*, G * )  yields the same allocation as (f *, g * ), if each agent reports the truth. But the incentive
compatibility constraints, which (f *, g •) satisfied, insure that each agent will want to report
truthfully. Thus, whatever can be done by any arbitrary mechanism subject to the Bayes incentive 
compatibility constraints can be done with direct revelation mechanisms subject to the constraint 
that each agent wants to report their true characteristic. One need only choose a function G : E -> X 
to 
maximize f W (G (e ), e )d 1t(e) 
subject to, for every i ,  e, and ei, 
and 
There are at least two problems with this approach to organizational design. The first is that the 
choice of mechanism depends crucially on the prior beliefs, 1t. This is a direct result of the use of
Bayes incentive compatibility in the constraints. Since the debate is still open let me simply 
summarize some of the arguments. One is that if the mechanism chosen for a given situation does 
not depend on common knowledge beliefs then we would not be using all the information at our 
disposal to pursue the desired goals and would do less than is possible. Further, since the beliefs are 
common knowledge we can all agree as to their validity (misrepresentation is not an issue) and 
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therefore to their legitimate inclusion in the calculations. An argument is made against this on the 
practical grounds that one need only consider actual situations, such as the introduction of new 
technology by a regulated utility or the acquisition of a major new weapons system by the 
government, to understand the difficulties involved in arriving at agreements about the particulars of 
common knowledge. Another argument against is based on the feeling that mechanisms should be 
robust. A "good" mechanism should be able to be described in terms of its mechanics and, while it 
probably should have the capacity to incorporate the common knowledge relevant to the current 
situation, it should be capable of being used in many situations. How to capture these criteria in the 
constraints or the objective function of the designer remains an open research question. 
The second problem with the optimal auction approach to organizational design is the 
reliance on the revelation principle. Restricting attention to direct revelation mechanisms, in which 
an agent reports his entire characteristic, is an efficient way to prove theorems, it provides little 
guidance for those interested in actual organization design. For example, it completely ignores the 
informational requirements of the process and any limitations, if any, in the information processing 
capabilities of the agents or the mechanism. Writing down one's preferences for all possible 
consumption patterns is probably harder than writing down one's entire demand surface, which is 
certainly harder than simply reacting to a single price vector and reporting only the quantities 
demanded at that price. A failure to recognize the information processing constraints in the 
optimization problem is undoubtedly one of the reasons there has been limited success in using the 
theory of optimal auctions to explain the existence of pervasive institutions, such as the first-price 
sealed-bid auction used in competitive contracting or the posted price institution used in retailing. 
Summary 
Incentive compatibility captures the fundamental positivist notion of self-interested behavior 
that underlies almost all economic theory and application. It has proven to be an organizing 
principle of great scope and power. Combined with the modem theory of mechanism design, it 
provides a framework in which to analyze such diverse topics as auctions, central planning, 
regulation of monopoly, transfer pricing, capital budgeting, and public enterprise management. 
Incentive compatibility provides a basic constraint on the possibilities for normative analysis. As 
such it serves aS-the fundamental interface between what is desirable and what is possible in a theory 
of organizations. 
10 
REFERENCES 
Baron, D. and R. Myerson. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs." Econometrica 50 
(1982):911-930. 
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond and E. Mas.kin. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some 
General Results on Incentive Compatibility." Review of Economic Studies 46 (1979): 185-
216. 
Gibbard, A. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result." Econometrica 41 (1973) :587-
602. 
Groves, T. and J. Ledyard. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider' 
Problem." Econometrica 45 (1977):783-809. 
Groves, T. and J. Ledyard. "Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later." In Information, Incentives, 
and Economic Mechanisms, Groves, Radner and Reiter, eds. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986, forthcoming. 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions." Econometrica 49 
(1981):1477-1499. 
Hurwicz, L. "Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes." In 
Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959, K. Arrow, S. Karlin and P. Suppes, eds., 
pp. 27-46. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960. 
Hurwicz, L. "On Informationally Decentralized Systems." In Decision and Organization: A 
Volume in Honor of JacobMarschak, R. Radner and C. B. McGuire, eds., pp. 297-336. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972. 
Hurwicz, L. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium 
Points." Review of Economic Studies 46 (1979):217-225. 
Ledyard, J. "Incomplete Information and Incentive Compatibility." Journal of Economic Theory 18 
(1978):171-189. 
Ledyard, J. and J. Roberts. "On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods." Discussion Paper No. 
116, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. Northwestern 
University, 1974. 
11 
Lindahl, E. Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteverung, Lund, 1919. Reprinted (in part) in Classics in the 
Theory of Public Finance., R. A Musgrave and AT. Peacock, eds. New York and London, 
1958. 
Matthews, S. "Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes." Journal of Economic 
Theory 30 (1983):370-400. 
Myerson, Roger B. "Optimal Auction Design." Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981):58-
73. 
Myerson, Roger B. "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility: An Introduction." In 
Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner, Hurwicz, 
Schmeidler and Sonnenschein, eds. Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Palfrey, Thomas and Sanjay Srivastava. "Implementation in Exchange Economies using 
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium." Graduate School of Industrial Administration, 
Carnegie-Mellon University, mimeo., July 1986. 
Palfrey, Thomas R. and Sanjay Srivastava. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations." Review of 
Economic Studies, 1986, in press. 
Postlewaite, Andrew and David Schmeidler. "Implementation in Differential Information 
Economics." The Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, in press. 
Roberts, J. and A. Postlewaite. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Economies." 
Econometrica 44 (1976):115-128. 
Samuelson, P. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures." Review of Economics and Statistics 36 
(1954):387-389. 
Satterthwaite, M. ,;Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence 
Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions." Journal of Economic 
Theory 10 (1975):187-217. 
Schmeidler, D. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions." Econometrica 48 
(1980):1585-1593. 
Walker, M. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations." 
Econometrica 49 (1981):65-71. 
